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Abstract
Background: This study aims to gain insight into the international development of GP incomes
over time through a comparative approach. The study is an extension of an earlier work (1975–
1990, conducted in five yearly intervals). The research questions to be addressed in this paper are:
1) How can the remuneration system of GPs in a country be characterized? 2) How has the annual
GP income developed over time in selected European countries? 3) What are the differences in GP
incomes when differences in workload are taken into account? And 4) to what extent do
remuneration systems, supply of GPs and gate-keeping contribute to the income position of GPs?
Methods: Data were collected for Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, the Netherlands,
Sweden and the United Kingdom. Written sources, websites and country experts were consulted.
The data for the years 1995 and 2000 were collected in 2004–2005. The data for 2005 were
collected in 2006–2007.
Results: During the period 1975–1990, the income of GPs, corrected for inflation, declined in all
the countries under review. During the period 1995–2005, the situation changed significantly: The
income of UK GPs rose to the very top position. Besides this, the gap between the top end (UK)
and bottom end (Belgium) widened considerably. Practice costs form about 50% of total revenues,
regardless of the absolute level of revenues. Analysis based on income per patient leads to a
different ranking of countries compared to the ranking based on annual income. In countries with
a relatively large supply of GPs, income per hour is lower. The type of remuneration appeared to
have no effect on the financial position of the GPs in the countries in this study. In countries with
a gate-keeping system the average GP income was systematically higher compared to countries
with a direct-access system.
Conclusion: There are substantial differences in the income of GPs among the countries included
in this study. The discrepancy between countries has increased over time. The income of British
GPs showed a marked increase from 2000 to 2005, due to the introduction of a new contract
between the NHS and GPs.
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Background
The remuneration of doctors in general and General Prac-
titioners in particular is an issue that has the attention of
policy makers in many countries. During the past decades,
in several countries health care reforms have affected the
income of GPs (e.g. in France, the Netherlands and the
UK). To what extent these developments are comparable
with trends in other European countries is unknown. The
aim of this paper is therefore to provide insight into the
development of the incomes of General Practitioners
(GPs) during the last decades in a number of European
countries. This study is an update and extension of an ear-
lier study by Delnoij [1], who provided an overview of the
income situation of GPs in eight European countries for
1975–1990 A summary of the findings of the Delnoij
study can be found in Annex 1 [see Additional file 1]. In
the present study, we have added the years 1995, 2000
and 2005.
The theory of supplier-induced demand suggests that GPs
can, at least to some extent, adjust their behaviour in order
to secure their income. A precondition for this is that the
remuneration system provides incentives for supplier-
induced demand [2-4]. The possibilities for General Prac-
titioners to generate an income are influenced by health
care system characteristics and by market forces (competi-
tion among GPs and between GPs and other physicians).
In the next paragraphs the effect of remuneration system,
access to primary care and competition will be discussed.
The type of remuneration (salary, capitation fee or fee-for-
service) provides different opportunities for increasing
income. When physicians receive a salary, increasing the
number of paid working hours can generate more income.
However, working more than a certain number of hours
(more than full-time) is often not compensated for. In sys-
tems where physicians receive a capitation fee (this is a
fixed amount per year for each patient on the GP's list),
physicians can boost their income by increasing the
number of patients registered at their practice (if there is
no fixed maximum number of listed patients). For GPs
who are paid a fee-for-service, providing more services can
generate a higher income. However, salaries or fees may
be subject to budget caps and/or agreements among GPs
and (governmental) health authorities or insurance com-
panies. These agreements are often the result of negotia-
tions between both parties and are valid for a fixed time
period. There is evidence that (changes in) fee-for-service
remuneration influences physician's behaviour [2,3,5-8].
Therefore, we assume that GPs who are paid a fee-for-serv-
ice have more opportunities to increase their income and
will thus have a higher income compared to their salaried
and capitation fee paid colleagues.
Competition among GPs depends on the supply of GPs and
their position compared to other health care providers.
We assume that for countries with an ample supply of
GPs, the relative income position of GPs will be less
favourable compared to countries where GPs are relatively
scarce. The bargaining position of GPs relative to other
physicians (e.g. medical specialists) is strongly influenced
by what is generally called the 'gate keeping' system: when
patients need a referral from a GP for access to specialist
care, GPs do not have to compete with medical specialists
for patients [9,10]. We therefore assume that the income
position of GPs in gate-keeping countries and in countries
with relatively fewer GPs is better than in direct access
countries and in countries where GPs are more abundant.
Delnoij [1] only compared the annual income of GPs. We
believe that, since GP workload differs among countries
[11], the results may differ if workload is taken into
account. Thus besides comparing annual income, we
included a comparison of income per hour worked and
per patient attended to.
The research questions that will be answered in this paper
are:
￿ How can the remuneration system of GPs in a country
be characterized?
￿ How has the annual GP income developed over time in
selected European countries?
￿ What are the differences in GP income when differences
in workload are taken into account?
￿ To what extent do the remuneration system, the supply
of GPs and gate-keeping contribute to the income situa-
tion of GPs?
Methods
Concepts and operationalizations
General Practitioner
The first concept concerns the question: What is a General
Practitioner? Here we used a pragmatic approach; for each
country we selected the type of physician that is indicated
by the following terms (or their equivalent as translated
into English): General Practitioner or Family Physician. As
a result, in some countries physicians that may provide
directly accessible and ambulatory medical care, for
instance paediatricians, gynaecologists and internists,
were excluded.
Income and types of remuneration
The  revenues  of GPs consist of the total remuneration
received from practising their profession.
In countries where GPs are self-employed, practice costs are
included in the fee structure. Practice costs are costs that are
intrinsic to practising general medicine and have to beBMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:26 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/26
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subtracted from the revenues of GPs. Practice costs
roughly consist of the following components: housing,
personnel, medical equipment, ICT, insurances and trans-
portation. In this study, practice costs are included only
when GPs themselves are responsible for these costs. In
most countries there is no readily available statistic on
practice costs. Accordingly, we used estimates provided by
country experts, preferably well documented. In order to
improve comparability among the countries, we will not
include remuneration for out-of-hours care, when possi-
ble.
The income of GPs was calculated as revenue minus practice
costs. For salaried  GPs, the revenues are equal to their
income, since the practice costs in these systems are normally
the responsibility of the health care organization that
employs the GPs. For GPs that receive capitation fees, the rev-
enue is the (annual) fee for patients multiplied by the
number of patients in a full-time general practice. Their
income is this revenue minus practice costs. These capitation
fees are sometimes differentiated according to certain criteria
such as age or social deprivation. For GPs that receive fee-for-
service remuneration, several types of service (e.g. office con-
sultations, home visits, telephone consultation, vaccina-
tions) may have different tariffs. The income is calculated as
revenues from fees-for-service minus practice costs.
The raw revenue data are often provided in local curren-
cies or Euros. In order to make figures comparable
between countries, we converted the revenue data into
Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs) [12]. PPPs can be
defined as currency conversion rates that both convert to
a common currency and equalize the purchasing power of
different currencies. They eliminate the differences in
price levels between countries in the process of converting
economic indicators expressed in a national currency to
an artificial common currency, called the Purchasing
Power Standard (PPS), expressed in US dollars. We
derived the PPPs from the World Development Indicator
reports 1997 (Table 5.5), 2002 (Table 5.6) and 2006
(Table 4.14, PPP conversion rates for 2004) [13-15] (See
Annex 1: Calculation of GP revenue per country [see Addi-
tional file 1]). When the available data were not from the
exact year requested (but for instance from one year earlier
or later), we corrected these data for inflation, using data
from the OECD health data files. When practice costs were
available for one year only, we estimated the practice costs
for the requested years using the available figure corrected
for inflation. To compare GP revenue over time, we
adjusted the revenue figures by the Consumer Price Index,
with the year 2000 as the reference year (source:
OECD.Stat Extracts [16]).
Competition
For GP-supply we use the data provided by country experts.
When these were not available, we used GP-density data
from within the OECD health data files [17]. Other phy-
sicians that provide directly accessible ambulatory care
(e.g. paediatricians, internists) were excluded. Informa-
tion on whether a gate-keeping system exists or specialist
care is directly accessible for patients is derived from the
work of Kroneman et al. [9].
Workload
Workload was operationalized in two ways: firstly, by the
number of hours worked per week. The exact number of
hours worked by full-time GPs may differ per country.
Where possible, the number of working hours per week
was derived from information supplied by country
experts. When this was not available we used the data pro-
vided by the study of Boerma et al. on GP task profiles
(data from 1993) [11]. The income or profit per hour was
calculated as follows: annual income or profit/((52-5
weeks)*working hours per week). We assumed 5 weeks
holiday per year. Secondly, the number of patients
attended to per full-time GP was determined. The income
(or profit) per patient was calculated as annual income (or
profit) divided by the number of patients served per full-
time GP. The number of patients per full-time GP is not
equal to the reciprocal of GP supply, since the first figure
is based on full-time working GPs and the latter on all
(including part-time working) GPs.
Data collection
As this study is a replication and an extension of the study
of Delnoij, the countries included are the same: Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands,
Sweden and the United Kingdom. The data from 1990
and before were derived from Delnoij [1]. For the infor-
mation on the remuneration of GPs, we firstly consulted
existing written sources (e.g. the European Observatory on
Health Care Systems) and websites. When the data were
either not available or language problems prevented inter-
pretation, we consulted country experts. The country
experts were either GPs, members of national GP-associa-
tions or medical associations or members of research
institutes dealing with health care issues. When an expert
was not able to provide the data requested, we asked
whether he/she could provide the name of a person who
could. We sent a tailor-made questionnaire to the experts,
in which we included what was already known about the
remuneration system, in order to make completion of the
questionnaire as easy as possible. The final country
descriptions were sent to the experts with the request to
check for errors and wrong interpretations. For extensive
country descriptions, see Annex 1: Calculation of GP rev-
enue per country [see Additional file 1].
The source of the data may influence the results of this
study: interest groups, like GP associations may tend to
underestimate GP income and overestimate practice costs
compared, for instance, to government bodies or insur-BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:26 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/26
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ance companies, since this can influence the bargaining
position of both parties. For this reason, the source of the
data is reported in Table 1.
Differences compared to Delnoij
For the sake of comparability, the same sources should
ideally be used in our study as in Delnoij's. However, it
was not always possible to use the same source, and some-
times more reliable data were available (for instance, the
practice costs for France in our study were based on GP tax
forms; in the study of Delnoij they were based on an esti-
mate of 40% of the total revenues). The exact differences
can be found in Annex 1: Calculation of GP revenue per
country [see Additional file 1].
Analyses
For the remuneration system and gate-keeping system, the
countries were divided into two groups: fee-for-service
payment and non-service related payments (capitation
fees and salary). For access to care also two groups were
formed: firstly, the gate-keeping system consisted of coun-
tries where patients have to go to a GP first (gate-keeping)
and secondly countries where patients may go to special-
ists directly (direct access). The average income per year
for each group was calculated and plotted over time. Due
to the low number of observations (eight countries) statis-
tical analyses were not applicable. For the workload,
cross-sectional comparisons were made for the year 2000.
The differences in ranking of the countries between
annual income and income corrected for workload was
evaluated using Spearman's rho. The relationship
between GP-supply and income was evaluated using Pear-
son's correlation coefficient from the SPSS statistical pack-
age version 14.0.
Results
Country descriptions (situation for 1995, 2000 and 2005)
Belgium
The Belgian GP is remunerated on the basis of a fee-for-
service system. Extra revenue is generated by having
patients of 50 years and older on the GP's list (managing
their medical record). These extra remunerations (so
called GMD-vergoedingen: General Medical Record allow-
ances) were introduced in 1999 and are included in the
figures for 2000 and 2005.
Denmark
In Denmark, the GPs derive their revenue from a capita-
tion fee, which makes up one third to half of their reve-
nue, and from fees for services rendered (per consultation,
examination, procedure etc.). In the period from 1995 to
2005 there was no change in the remuneration system but
only small adjustments in the fees and the types of fees.
However, the proportion of fees for services has gone up
due to an increase in activities in GP practices.
Finland
In Finland general practitioners work in health centres.
Two payment systems exist. Traditionally, payment is
mainly based on a monthly salary with additional pay-
ments based on, among other factors, seniority and skills.
Work that exceeds 37 hours a week is remunerated sepa-
rately from the salary.
The second system is called the personal doctor system,
which is a special remuneration formula determined by a
basic salary (which can be only about 60–85% of the tradi-
tional monthly salary described in the paragraph above),
that is supplemented by a payment per consultation (5–6
euro per consultation) for patients that consulted their GP
less than three times in the previous year and a monthly
Table 1: Data source and health care organization characteristics related to GP revenue.
Data sources Health care organization characteristics
Country Revenue/income Practice costs Remuneration system Gate-keeping
Belgium Interest group Interest group Fee-for-service No
Denmark Interest group and government 
agency
Interest group and government 
agency
Fee-for-service Yes
Finland WHO (2000) and independent 
organization
- Mainly salary, some additional fee-
for-service and capitation fee
Yes
France Government agency Tax office Fee-for-service No
Germany Independent organization Independent organization Fee-for-service No
Netherlands Interest group National statistics office 
(based on tax data)
Capitation and fee-for-service1) Yes
Sweden Interest group - Salary No
U.K. Independent organization (1995, 
2000), government agency (2005)
Independent organization (1995, 
2000), government agency (2005)
Capitation, since 2004 additional 
quality related payments
Yes
1) The remuneration of GPs in The Netherlands is a combination of a capitation fee for the publicly insured patients (about 2/3 of the annual 
revenues) and a fee-for-service for the privately insured patients (about 1/3 of the total revenues). Since the share of fee-for-service is substantial, 
the Netherlands is characterized in the analyses as a fee-for-service countryBMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:26 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/26
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"capitation" payment (1.60 – 1.95 euro per month) for the
so-called frequent visitors – those who visited their GP
more than three times in the previous year. This pro-
gramme leads to higher total revenue compared to the tra-
ditional system, but the GP is not protected by the limit of
37 hours, as there is no formal working week, just a require-
ment to offer services on weekdays.
In Finland a small private sector exists, where physicians
are paid on a fee-for-service basis. In 1999 only 8% of all
doctors worked full time in private practice. These private
sector GPs were excluded from our analysis.
France
General Practitioners in France are mainly paid on a fee-
for-service basis. In 2005 the "Médecin traitant" (treating
physician) was introduced. This physician keeps the med-
ical record of the patient and makes referrals to other
medical care. In March 2007, 82% of the insured popula-
tion had chosen a médecin traitant [18], 99% of whom
were GPs. Patients who don't register with a médecin
traitant, or who visit a specialist without consulting their
médecin traitant, receive lower reimbursement. Then treat-
ing physicians received, in addition to the usual fee-for-
service, ~40 per year for each patient with a chronic dis-
ease who chose them as record keeper.
Germany
The payment of ambulatory physicians (both general
practitioners and specialists) is a two-stage process. First,
the public health insurance funds make total payments to
physicians' associations in the form of negotiated capita-
tion fees for each member (insured person) of the fund.
These negotiated budgets are subsequently distributed
among the members of the physicians' associations
according to a Uniform Value Scale. This scale contains a
list of all services that can be provided by physicians for
remuneration within the statutory health insurance sys-
tem. Each of these services is awarded a certain number of
points. Physicians invoice their associations each quarter
for the total number of points generated by the services
rendered. The total negotiated budget is divided by total
number of points. The monetary value of the points is
then used to calculate the physicians' quarterly remunera-
tion. From 1997 to 2003 the number of reimbursable
points per patient was limited. In 2007 the remuneration
system will have changed to a system with negotiated
morbidity-oriented service volumes.
The Netherlands
Until 2006, the remuneration of Dutch GPs depended on
the type of insurance held by the patient. For publicly
insured patients, GPs received a capitation fee. Since 1995
the fee depended on the number of patients in the prac-
tice: the flat fee for the first 1,600 patients on the list was
higher than for those above the 1,600. In 2000 and 2005
the capitation fee was differentiated by the patient's age
[see Additional file 1]. For privately insured patients, a fee
for service system existed, with fixed fees. Approximately
2/3 of the population was publicly insured and 1/3 pri-
vately [19]. For the purposes of this paper, our analysis of
the Netherlands is based on this system.
Sweden
In Sweden, county councils are responsible for ambula-
tory health care provision. Payments to primary care cen-
tres are normally based on all-in budgets, and payment
principles may vary among the county councils. Physi-
cians are in salaried service at primary care centres. As
such, they receive a monthly salary from the county coun-
cils. Since the mid 1990s, in some counties GPs receive an
additional capitation fee for each patient, to increase their
monthly income. In the last decades, the differentiation
among the Swedish counties has increased and nowadays
there exist as many health care systems as there are coun-
ties in Sweden, with all counties operating a different mix
of salary, capitation and fee-for-service for GPs, which
makes it impossible to determine "the" Swedish remuner-
ation system.
United Kingdom
Before 2004, the revenues of physicians in the United
Kingdom were determined by a basic allowance, supple-
mented by allowances based on factors including the
number of listed patients, patient characteristics (age,
chronic conditions, living in deprived areas) and some
types of services rendered. There was a slight gradient in
revenue due to seniority (depending on the number of
years a GP is registered).
In 2004, the payment system changed from GP-based to
practice-based, with an all-in budget. Payment was still
based on characteristics of the patient list, but additional
revenue could be earned when certain quality require-
ments were met. There were four domains for quality
improvement: the clinical domain (with an emphasis on
certain diseases), the organizational domain (including:
information, communication, education and practice
management), the additional services domain (cervical
screening, child health surveillance, maternity services
and contraceptive services) and finally the patient experi-
ence domain which consists of how services are provided
and the involvement of patients in service development
plans.
The type of remuneration system per country is summa-
rized in Table 1.
Developments in GP income over time
In Additional file 2], the average revenue, practice costs
and income of GPs in the eight countries in our study are
displayed in monetary terms.BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:26 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/26
Page 6 of 12
(page number not for citation purposes)
When we deflate GP income by the consumer price index
(using OECD data on the consumer price index with base
year 2000 = 100, see Table 2), we see that the income of
GPs declined during the period from 1975 to 1985, then
stabilized until the year 1995 and after that increased
again, although real income in 2005 is still lower than in
1975 for most countries (except for the UK and Ger-
many). Figure 1 reveals that the differences between the
countries became larger in 2005 compared to the earlier
years. GP income in Belgium is the lowest compared to
the other countries, this difference becoming even more
sizeable in recent years. GP income in the UK increased
markedly from 2000 to 2005, turning the British GPs into
the best paid doctors compared to their colleagues in the
other countries (see Figure 1 and Table 2).
The average inflation corrected annual income of GPs in
countries with a salary or capitation system appeared to be
lower than the incomes in fee-for-service payment sys-
tems until the beginning of the 1990s (see Figure 2). In
1995 and 2000 no difference was found between both
remuneration systems. In 2005 the situation changed into
a more favourable position for non-service related remu-
Annual GP income over time in ppp$, corrected for inflation, index year = 2000 Figure 1
Annual GP income over time in ppp$, corrected for inflation, index year = 2000.
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neration systems. This was again mainly due to the high
rise in income for the UK GPs.
Practice costs
In 2005, in the countries where GPs are independent pro-
fessionals, the share of practice costs in total revenues was
relatively similar between countries (varying from 46% to
61%, with an average of 52%), although in absolute terms
(in pppUS$) the practice costs varied considerably. In the
UK, practice costs in 2005 were about four times higher
than in Belgium (see Table 2). During the 1995–2005
period, the average share of practice costs varied from 50%
to 56%. Two outliers were found: Belgium at the top end,
with over 60% for the period from 1995 to 2000 and the
UK at the bottom end with 29% in 2000. When we look at
the average practice costs per patient in pppUS$ in 2000,
Table 2: Income of GPs over time, corrected for inflation, index year is 2000 = 100
Country 19751) 19801) 19851) 1990 1995 2000 2005
Belgium 56,309 56,295 38,476 38,389 20,864 25,602 30,413
Denmark 122,355 84,239 67,283 57,747 83,782 85,362 98,249
Finland 85,485 61,433 46,132 45,566 - 47,213 65,801
France 92,876 67,729 51,827 52,401 57,670 53,889 64,607
Germany 84,048 83,897 78,192 78,723 85,342 96,325 103,158
Netherlands 102,988 89,120 74,360 77,305 58,267 65,842 92,945
Sweden 101,959 66,685 46,832 42,812 48,594 54,124 62,007
United Kingdom 103,297 80,289 66,864 63,624 76,278 80,580 155,360
1) Figures based on Delnoij [1]
Fee-for-service versus non-service related annual income (salary and capitation fee) over time in pppUS$, corrected for infla- tion (index year is 2000)1) Figure 2
Fee-for-service versus non-service related annual income (salary and capitation fee) over time in pppUS$, cor-
rected for inflation (index year is 2000)1). 1) The data for 1975–1990 are based on Delnoij [1].
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Germany ranks highest and UK lowest (see Table 3). Due to
the large numbers of patients in Dutch GP practices, Dutch
practice costs per patient are relatively low. From 2000 to
2005, the UK changed from having the lowest practice costs
per patient to the highest practice costs per patient.
GP income and workload
The annual income of GPs may differ among countries
because of differences in workload (see Table 4). Work-
load can be expressed in either number of patients that
have to be taken care of or working hours.
The income per patient for 2000 showed a top position for
Germany and France with about 80–100 pppUS$ per
patient. The UK and Denmark captured a middle position
(about 50 pppUS$ per patient). All other countries had a
much lower income per patient, around 25–35 pppUS$.
Compared to the ranking of countries by annual income,
the situation of France and the Netherlands was remarka-
ble. France ranked much higher when income was
expressed in income per patient and the Netherlands
much lower compared to their annual income position.
Statistical analysis showed that there was no significant
relationship between the rankings of the countries for
annual income and income per patient (Spearman's rho =
0.45, p = 0.26).
The highest income per hour in 2000 was earned in Den-
mark (slightly more than 38 pppUS$) followed by Ger-
many (31 pppUS$ per patient). The lowest income per
hour was earned in France and Belgium (less than 20
pppUS$). In all other countries GPs earned between 20
and 30 pppUS$ per hour. The ranking of countries by
income per hour and income per year were significantly
correlated (Spearman's rho = 0.88, p = 0.004).
Competition
GP-supply in 2000 (see Table 4) showed a strong negative
relationship with income per working hour (Pearson's r =
-0.79, p = 0.02), but no relationship with GP annual
income (Pearson's r = -0.48, p = 0.23) and income per
patient (Pearson's r = 0.24, p = 0.57).
Over time, GPs in gate-keeping countries showed a higher
income on average compared to their colleagues in direct
access countries, (see Figure 3).
Discussion
Income over time
The annual income of GPs varied substantially among the
eight countries in this study, both over time and among
countries. Corrected for inflation, the purchasing power
of GPs declined during the period from 1975 until 1990,
which is probably the result of cost containment policies
in most countries during that time. From 1995 onwards,
in most countries the income position of GPs improved,
with the greatest increase taking place in the UK. An unex-
pected finding was that income differences between the
countries have increased in the past decade. The introduc-
tion of the new remuneration system in the UK in 2004
had a striking effect on the income of British GPs, result-
ing in the position of best paid GPs in 2005. Belgian GPs
remained the lowest paid GPs over time. The low income
of Belgian GPs may be an artefact of the calculation
method, in which we used estimates based on a paper pro-
vided by the Belgian Association of GPs. However, an
external audit in 2002 in Belgium produced similar results
[20], supporting our findings.
The increase in income differences over time is somewhat
surprising, as it might have been expected that improved
opportunities for job mobility within the EU would have
had an equalizing effect on income. The findings suggest that
institutional factors are more important than market compe-
tition in explaining GP income differences between coun-
tries. The income differences may also reflect differences in
status and importance attached to GP services, as well as dif-
ferences in the bargaining power of GPs between countries.
Independent GPs appeared to spend on average 50% of
their revenues on practice costs, regardless of the absolute
Table 3: Overview of practice costs (2000 and 2005) per patient in countries where GPs are independent entrepreneurs in pppUS$
Country Practice costs
2000
Number of
patients per GP1)
2000
Practice costs
per patient 2000
Practice costs
2005
Number of
patients per GP1)
2005
Practice costs
per patient 2005
Belgium 46,709 860 54.31 51,941 860 60.40
Denmark 70,109 1311 53.48 98,541 1285 76.69
France 46,422 622 74.68 59,778 605 98.81
Germany 113,846 937 121.44 124,606 1027 121.33
Netherlands 94,709 2529 37.45 107,115 2529 42.35
UK 32,829 1600 20.52 216,545 1415 153.04
1)For Belgium, Denmark and The Netherlands, the number of patients per GP is based on the figures for a full-time GP from country specific 
sources [see Additional 1], for the other countries, the figures are derived from the OECD health data files 2006.BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:26 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/26
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Table 4: Different income units (per year, per patient and per working hour) for 2000 (income data in pppUS$, sorted by income on 
annual basis)
Country Annual income 
2000
Number of patients 
per GP1)
Income per patient Working hours2) Income per hour GP-density
Germany 96,325 937 102.75 60 31.03 1.1
Denmark 85,362 1311 65.11 43 38.53 0.9
UK 80,580 1600 50.37 58 26.72 0.6
Netherlands 65,842 2529 26.03 44 28.78 0.5
Sweden 54,124 1898 28.52 38 27.18 0.5
France 53,889 622 81.40 56 18.44 1.6
Finland 47,213 1384 34.11 38 23.89 0.7
Belgium 25,602 860 29.77 40 12.31 2.1
1) For Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands, the number of patients per GP is based on the figures for a full-time GP as used in this study; for the 
other countries, the figures are derived from the OECD health data files 2006.
2) Working hours per week. For Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK the figures are based on data collected in this 
study. For the UK, the figure includes being on-call [26]. For Finland and Sweden, the figures are based on the rather old study of Boerma (data 
collection in 1993) [27].
3) The remuneration of GPs in the Netherlands is a combination of a capitation fee for the publicly insured patients (about 2/3 of the annual 
revenues) and a fee-for-service for the privately insured patients (about 1/3 of the total revenues). Since the share of fee-for-service is substantial, 
we characterized the Netherlands as a fee-for-service country.
The average annual income of GPs in gate-keeping versus direct access countries over time, corrected for inflation (index year  = 2000)1) Figure 3
The average annual income of GPs in gate-keeping versus direct access countries over time, corrected for 
inflation (index year = 2000)1). 1) The data for 1975–1990 are based on Delnoij [1].
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level of the revenues. This implies that GPs with a higher
income also generate higher practice costs.
We cannot conclude that one specific remuneration sys-
tem generated higher incomes than another throughout
the years under review.
Workload
Limiting oneself to the comparison of annual income
neglects differences in workload between countries. The
fact that the workload of GPs varies internationally has
been established in the study of Boerma [11]. We discov-
ered that the country rank order of GP income per patient
and income per working hour differed slightly from the
annual income ranking, although the difference was not
statistically significant. However, since the currently avail-
able information on workload is rather outdated, the
influence of workload on income should be assessed in
future research, in combination with research on work-
load differences.
Competition
We argued that a large supply of GPs would lead to a
weaker income position. The supply of GPs showed no
relationship with income per year, which is in contrast to
earlier findings [1,21]. However, in countries with a rela-
tively large number of GPs, income per hour was lower.
Accordingly, it seemed that GPs have to work more hours
when there are fewer patients per GP available to obtain a
similar level of annual income.
We also argued that GPs in a gate-keeping system have a
better market position compared to GPs in a direct access
system, because the former do not have to compete for
patients with their specialized colleagues. The results of
this study seem to support this hypothesis, since over time
the average income of GPs in gate-keeping countries is
higher compared to the average income of their colleagues
in countries with direct access to secondary care.
Limitations of the study
This study has several limitations, which will be discussed
below.
Limited data
Our study was based on the data of eight countries, which
is of course a very low number. As a result, outlier posi-
tions may strongly influence the relationships that have
been studied. We believe, however, that this study is rele-
vant, since it is, to our knowledge, the only longitudinal
study of GP income, where health care system characteris-
tics have been taken into account.
Revenues, costs and income
In most countries, GP revenue is not the subject of routine
monitoring. Ideally, income figures should be compiled
from information on tax declarations. When this is not
available, the GP income may be based on estimates.
These figures can be biased, depending on the interest of
the organization that provides the estimate. Organized
interest groups of GPs may provide a lower estimate for
income and a higher estimate for costs compared to
organizations that have to pay the remuneration (govern-
ment bodies or health insurance organizations). As an
example, we show differences in the estimates of practice
costs of Dutch GPs. In the Netherlands, three different
sources were available for estimating practice costs: The
estimate by the body that establishes the fee rates for GPs
(CTG-Zaio [22]) is much lower (60% of the total income)
than the estimate calculated on behalf of the Dutch
National Association of General Practitioners (LHV [23];
93% of the total revenues in our calculations). This may
also explain the high practice costs for Belgium, because
the source used here was an estimate established by a
group representing the interest of GPs. Furthermore, the
difference in share of practice costs for UK GPs over time
could also be explained by this phenomenon. The practice
costs in the remuneration system before 2004 were esti-
mated by the Review Body on Doctors' and Dentists'
Remuneration. Although this is an independent organiza-
tion, due to the lack of reliable data on practice costs, a
rather old study on practice costs was used to obtain their
estimates. The review body argued that practice costs had
decreased since 1990 because of the introduction of com-
puters [24], resulting in the relatively low share of practice
costs (29%) in 2000. The figure for 2005 for the UK was
based on tax declarations and will probably be more real-
istic.
In this study we tried to harmonize income figures by
attempting to compare full-time GP incomes without out-
of-hour compensation. However, the data were not
always available in this format. For France and the UK, for
instance, the income data relate to average GP income and
for Germany and France, out-of-hours compensation is
included. The share of out-of-hours compensation varies
among countries. For Germany, out-of-hour compensa-
tion is estimated to be about 1.4% of the income gener-
ated from publicly insured patients [25]; in the
Netherlands, this income component will increase the
revenues by 7% on average.
Practice cost components
Some components of practice costs may contain a hidden
income component. Sometimes practice costs are reim-
bursed on the basis of actual expenditure, whereas other
costs are reimbursed according to estimates and are paya-
ble, regardless of whether these costs have been made or
not and independently of the real expenditure. In the lat-
ter case, this reimbursement may (partly) result in extra
income when this type of practice costs is lower or even
absent. In the UK for instance, the compensation for ICT-BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:26 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/26
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equipment is rather generous and may exceed actual
expenditure. The expenditure for social security payments
may also differ. In the UK, the pension premium is fully
compensated for. In the Netherlands and Germany, GPs
have to pay these costs from their annual income.
Comparison over time
The slight lack of continuity in trends between the figures
of Delnoij (1975–1990) and this study (1995–2005) may
reflect real changes in GP income. However, it is also plau-
sible that differences in data collection and calculation
methods account for a major part of the lack of continuity.
This is especially the case for Belgium. In Delnoij's study
practice costs were estimated at 30% of total income,
whereas in our estimates practice costs account for 60–
70% of total income. When we changed the estimate of
the practice cost in our calculations to 30%, Belgium
remained at the lower end, slightly above Finland.
Other methodological issues
An important limitation of the study is the small number
of countries included, due to which the strong increase in
income in the United Kingdom in 2005 had a relatively
large influence on the results.
In international comparative research, the comparability
of the data is always a point of discussion. In our study
this is also a relevant issue. For instance, working hours
for some countries are based on relatively old data (1993)
and the number of GPs in a country is not always easily
established. Sometimes non-active GPs are included in
figures; in other countries, GPs may not be counted as sep-
arate group of physicians, in which case an estimate must
be made. Another problem is the exclusion of paediatri-
cians and internists from the calculation of GP supply. In
countries where paediatricians and/or internists are
directly accessible for primary care services as well, the
estimate of GP supply may be too low (e.g. in Germany).
Conclusion
To summarize, we conclude that there are substantial dif-
ferences in income of GPs over time and among the coun-
tries included in this study. Income differences have also
increased in the last decade. The remuneration system
appears to have no clear influence on the income of GPs.
A larger supply of GPs in a country, was associated with a
lower income per hour. GPs in gate-keeping systems
appear to have a higher average income over time com-
pared to their colleagues in countries with direct access
systems. Further research is necessary on workload differ-
ences among GPs (including part-time work) and on prac-
tice costs: what elements are included and what are the
determinants of the extent of these costs.
Changes after 2005
Future trends after 2005 may depend on new changes in
remuneration systems.
In the Netherlands, the system of privately and publicly
insured persons was abolished in January 2006 and a new
system with a basic insurance for all was introduced. At
the same time, the remuneration system for GPs was
changed to a basic capitation fee, differentiated by age and
deprivation area and supplemented by a fee-for-service
system for each consultation. This current system, which
is not included in the income calculations of this study, is
expected to influence Dutch GP incomes. In the UK, the
rise in income will probably not continue, as payment lev-
els were frozen in the 2006–2007 contract. A new survey
in 2010 should reveal whether the increasing trend since
1995, shown in Figure 1, will continue or not.
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